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ARGUMENT 
Point h This Court should give effect to the plain language of the escape statute and 
to the legislative intent for repealing the absconding statute. 
The State attempts to torture the escape statute by reading into it words and intent 
that are just not there. The state legislature specifically acted to take escape from parole 
out of the hands of the county prosecutors and place it under the Board of Pardons and 
Parole. 
Point 2. Mr. Richardson was denied due process of law when he was not bound 
over nor arraigned, 
Utah Constitution Article I section 7 provides: "No person shall be deprived of 
Life, liberty or property without due process of law." 
Riggins v. District Court of Salt Lake County, 51 P.2d 645 Utah 1935 reads in part: 
,
M
 Due process of law requires that notice be given to the persons whose rights are 
to be affected. It "hears before it condemns, proceeds upon inquiry, and renders judgment 
only after trial/1 It is difficult to believe that the Legislature intended to empower the court 
to find "that the material allegations of the petition or complaint are true" without giving 
the defendant an opportunity to be heard. It is elementary that a court may not make 
findings binding upon a defendant without a hearing, or an opportunity to be heard. An act 
which authorized a court to make findings binding upon a defendant without giving him an 
opportunity to be heard must fail 
Affirmatively cited for this proposition in, Pangea Technologies. Inc. v. Internet 
Promotions, Inc. 2004 WL 1092239 Utah,2004 May 18, 2004. 
REPLY TO THE STATES ARGUMENT REGARDING THE OFFENSE OF 
ESCAPE 
The state legislature has specifically addressed the issue presented. The Appellee 
asserts that the legislature could not have meant to exclude parolee's from the escape 
statute, despite the plain language of the statute. Appellee says "Moreover, reading the 
parole exception to modify only the fourth situation is the only reading that avoids the 
'absurd result or [a result that] is 'unreasonable confused, inoperable, or in blatant 
contravention of the express purpose of a statute.'" quoting Savage, 2004 UT102 " 
(Appellee's brief at page 15.) 
The entirety of that quote from the Savage case reads: 
"2A Sutherland Statutory Constr. § 46:1 (6th ed.2004). An equally well-settled caveat to 
the plain meaning rule states that a court should not follow the literal language of a statute 
if its plain meaning works an absurd result or is "unreasonably confused, inoperable, or in 
blatant contravention of the express purpose of a statute." Perrine v. Kennecott Mining 
Corp.. 911 P.2d 1290. 1292 (Utah 1996). Above all, "[t]his courts primary objective in 
construing enactments is to give effect to the legislature's intent." Gohlerv. Wood. 919 
R2d 561. 562 (Utah 1996)." 
The Savage case involved the tort of negligent placement of a foster child. 
As it turns out the legislature specifically meant to exclude parolee's from the 
escape statute as is clearly set forth. In fact the legislature had created a wholly new 
escape statute for persons under probation or parole status, that crime was called 
absconding. (Utah code section 76-8-309.5 [2000] repealed 2004), 
That section was specifically repealed by Senate bill 0158 in the 2004 general session of 
the legislature. The oral presentation by the bill's sponsor Senator Bell clearly sets forth 
the intent of the legislature to not add an offense to persons who either escaped or 
absconded from parole. 
A transcript of the passage of the bill follows: 
X 
"Senate Bill 158 criminal offense amendments Senator BelT 
"Thank you Mr. President Pro Tern 
Ah this is an interesting little bill that may be of interesting only to defendants and criminal 
defense attorneys. But, a few years ago the criminal justice community approached the 
legislature and said that they wanted to strengthen the offense of absconding because they 
felt like that would dissuade criminals from escaping custody and this would be an 
additional felony in most cases. Well what has happened is that it's has dissuaded no one. 
And the actual defendants instead of being handled through the probation and parole 
system now have to come back for a whole new offense. We Feel like it is doubling up on 
beds in the sense that were adding charge on charge and a so hat in hand with the same 
community that advocated for this bill a few years ago came back and said it's not 
working we need to a to a liberalize this law so that People who escape will be handled for 
in most cases will be handled through the probation and parole system. And so, with that I 
would be open for questions/' 
Opened for questions. 
Senator Bell moved for the third reading 
Roll call vote passed 23 aye votes no nay votes 
As can clearly be seen the purpose and intent of Senator Bell who sponsored senate bill 
0158 was to do away with absconding so that parolees who left supervision, escaped were 
not charged with additional offenses and were not subject to additional sanctions, except 
under the auspices of the probation and parole system. (Floor and committee debates on 
bills are not transcribed, therefore one must listen to the floor debate on the legislatures 
web site at "le.Utah.gov." per the Legislative Webmaster please see exhibit A). 
It is the Appellee who wishes an absurd interpretation of the clear language of the 
escape statute. Appellee suggests in his brief (page 12) that any person on parole status 
that commits a new offense for which he is arrested, who subsequently escapes, could not 
be charged with escape. That is an absurd reading, because the person is not on parole for 
the new offense, he is in official custody for that offense so of course the escape statute 
would apply. (Exhibit B is a copy of Senate Bill 158). 
MR. RICHARDSON'S STATUS AS A PAROLEE NEVER CHANGED 
The interchange from the Preliminary Hearing is very instructive in this matter. Mr. 
John Beaslin, counsel for Mr, Richardson questioned Mr, James Murray on cross 
examination. From the interchange it is clear that Mr. Richardson is on Parole, under the 
jurisdiction/supervision of parole oflBcer James Murray. The interchange is found on pages 
12,13 and 14 of the transcript of preliminary hearing held September 1, 2004 and reads as 
follows; 
Mr. Beaslin: 
Q. Mr. Murray, based upon you conversation, as I understand it, what you did is in 
Duchesne County he got a class A DUI? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And at that point in time you then - that became a violation of his parole? 
A. Correct. 
Q. So in lieu of you sending him back to prison you said why don't you join - I'll 
give you 60 day Half-Way Back Program where you can to work and you'll be housed in 
the Uintah County jail; is that right? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So during this entire time from then until now when he was later picked up in 
Salt Lake City, he is technically on Parole. 
A. True. 
Q. And so he can not - he has now been charged with escape. So he hasn't escaped 
from anybody other than to violate probation - his parole rather. I'm sorry, parole; right? 
A. I don't know. 
Q. Well, wouldn't that be true? He - what he did he violated his parole when he 
didn't come back on the Half-Way Back Program; right? 
A. He did. 
Q. So he essentially was picked up, he then now went to the prison - he went back 
to prison for a violation by the Board of Pardons; right? 
A. He has been there, yes. 
Q. And so your jurisdiction over him terminated at that point -
A. Terminated when? I still have jurisdiction over him. 
Q. Here in Uintah County? 
A. Here in Uintah County. He's still on parole. 
Q. Right. But has the Board of Pardons done anything with reference to his 
violation to keep him out there? 
H-
A. He's ordered him held. 
Q. Okay. So he's held until this hearing? 
A. He's held until we have a revocation hearing. 
Q. Oh, I see. Okay. That has not been done? 
A. It hasn't done because of his charge pending. Also he has a - this DUI case that 
he had in Duchesne County which is falling under the Board of Pardons Jurisdiction. It is 
set for hearing - it supposed to be scheduled for hearing soon too. I don't know when 
though. 
Q. So but you didn't violate him for that, did you? You notified them and you then 
put him in the Half-Way Back Program here in Uintah County for 60 days; is that right? 
A. Well, we didn't ask for revocation. 
Q. That's what I mean, yeah. So you -
A. We still - we still prepared a report. We sent in a waiver stating he agreed to do 
the program at the Uintah County Jail. 
Q. I understand. 
A. And as far as we're concerned he's an inmate at the county jail 
Q. Okay. 
A. Giving a Half-Way - you know - given work - a work release -
Q. Right. 
A. - even though he's on parole status. 
Q. Okay. So his true status so is that a parole period. 
A. Well, I think he has two statuses here. I think he has a status as a county inmate 
doing time pursuant to the Board of Pardons Hearing. 
Q. Because he's -
A. He's also on parole. 
Q. Yeah. So they were housing him here under that program. 
A. Yes. 
Q. But he didn't escape from the jail, did he? 
A. He didn't return. 
Q, I know. 
A. And he was authorized -1 mean he's authorized confined at the county jail. 
Q. Right. 
A. He was authorized to report to work from 5 a.m. until 10 p.m. He did not 
return. 
Q. All right. So he violated his parole - your program that you had for him, the 
Half-Way Back. 
A. Yeah. 
There remains no question that Mr. Richardson was on parole, that the supervising 
agent was James Murray. Since there was no longer an absconding statute the escape 
statue was stretched/violated to punish Mr. Richardson in contravention to the intent of 
the law. His punishment for absconding was to be meted out by the Board of Pardons 
r 
under Utah law 
THE STATE OF UTAH ARGUED IN THEIR BRIEF THAT DEFENDANT 
WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO BE ARRAIGNED. DESPITE THE FACT THAT 
THERE IS NO SUCH WAIVER IN THE RECORD 
Rule 10 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that following the bind 
over by the magistrate, "the defendant shall forthwith be arraigned in the district court" 
In this case at preliminary hearing the defense objected to the charge of escape brought 
against the defendant since as a parolee the defendant was not properly charged (Index 
107 transcript of preliminary hearing pages page 3 lines 6-17) The trial court did not issue 
its ruling on the issue until the day of the trial (Index 109 Trial transcript September 15, 
2004, page 60 lines 13-24 {the correct date of the trial may be November 15, 2004) The 
written ruling on the issue is dated November 10, 2004 (Record pages 50 and 51) The 
record does not reflect that the defendant was either bound over nor arraigned at the 
preliminary hearing The preliminary hearing ended with the requirement that the parties 
brief the issues of escape and parole status (Record page 107 transcript of preliminary 
hearing page 17 lines 12-24) There were no hearings between November 10 and trial 
there is a minute entry of a hearing November 10, 2004, the minute entry reflects that Mr 
Richardson was not present (Record page 52) Mr Richardson was not bound over nor 
arraigned on the date of the trial either (Index 109 transcript of trial) Due process 
requires that following any bind over the defendant "shall forthwith be arraigned in the 
district court" (Rule 10 Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure) Utah Constitution Article I 
section 7 provides "No person shall be deprived of Life, liberty or property without due 
process of law " The defendant is to be aJBTorded an opportunity to be arraigned and plead 
(o 
unless he waives that opportunity. Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and 
State v. Jensen. 83 Utah 452, 30 P2d 203 (1934). 
It is the burden of the defense to marshal the evidence in this instance to show the 
negative, to show that Mr. Richardson was not arraigned. It is the absence of any record 
of bind over or arraignment that is in place here. There appears in the record no bind over 
order oral or written, and there is no record of arraignment or even any hearing dates 
where the defendant was present, between the issuance of the written order and the 
commencement of the trial 5 days later. There appears in the record no other opportunity 
for an arraignment. 
The failure to bind the defendant over or to arraign him is reversible error. 
CONCLUSION 
The Appellant herein seeks a ruling from this Court reversing his conviction for 
Escape. Dismissing the case or remanding it for further proceedings as may be 
appropriate. Such other and further relief as is just and appropriate. 
Cleve Hatch/Attorney for 
the Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
Email from "Legislative webmaster" "Floor and committee debates are not transcribed. 
You can listen to floor debate on this bill at the web site "le.utah.gov." 
S.B. 158 Criminal Offense Amendments 2004 General Session 
ADDENDUM 
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Subject: Re: senate bill 0158 2004 general session 
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site "le.utah.gov." 
Thank you for using our website. 
Legislative Webmaster 
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<t Approved for Filing: S.C. Allred f. 
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1 CRIMINAL OFFENSE AMENDMENTS 
2 2004 GENERAL SESSION 
3 STATE OF UTAH 
4 Sponsor: Gregory S. Bell 
5
 x a B a 8 S B a B a B a g a s a B a B H B B B B B ^^ 
6 LONG TITLE 
7 General Description: 
8 This bill repeals the criminal provision of absconding and amends related provisions. 
9 Highlighted Provisions: 
10 This bill: 
11 repeals the offense of absconding and amends criminal code and juvenile offender 
12 provisions affected by this repealer. 
13 Monies Appropriated in this Bill: 
14 None 
15 Other Special Clauses: 
16 This bill provides an effective date. 
17 Utah Code Sections Affected: 
18 AMENDS: 
19 62A-7-106 (Superseded 07/01/04), as last amended by Chapter 203, Laws of Utah 
20 2000 
21 62A-7-106 (Effective 07/01/04), as last amended by Chapter 171, Laws of Utah 2003 
22 76-8-306, as last amended by Chapter 179, Laws of Utah 2003 
23 REPEALS: 
24 76-8-309.5, as last amended by Chapter 203, Laws of Utah 2000 
26 Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah: 
27 Section 1. Section 62A-7-106 (Superseded 07/01/04) is amended to read: 
uiiiiini 
S.B.158 01-30-0411:58 AM 
28 62A-7-106 (Superseded 07/01/04). Aiding or concealing youth offender -
29 Trespass - Criminal penalties. 
30 (1) A person who commits any of the following offenses is guilty of a class A 
31 misdemeanor: 
32 (a) entering, or attempting to enter, a building or enclosure appropriated to the use of 
33 youth offenders, without permission; 
34 (b) entering any premises belonging to a secure facility and committing or attending 
35 to commit a trespass or depredation on those premises; or 
36 (c) willfully annoying or disturbing the peace and quiet of a secure facility or of a youth 
37 offender in a secure facility. 
38 (2) A person is guilty of a third degree felony who: 
39 (a) knowingly haibors or conceals a youth offender who has: 
40 (i) escaped from a secure facility; or 
41 (ii) absconded from: 
42 (A) a facility or supervision^ as these offenses arc defined in Subsections 
43 76»8"309.5(l)and(2)}; or 
44 (B) supervision of the Division of Youth Corrections; or 
45 (b) willfully aided or assisted a youth offender who has been lawfully committed to a 
46 secure facility in escaping or attempting to escape from that facility. 
47 (3) As used in this section: 
48 (a) a ypptfe Qffgpder afrscQRds from a facility w t o fre; 
49 ft) teavfrg the facility without pgrmijappn; pr 
50 (ii) fails to return at a prescribed time. 
51 ft>) A ywtfr ofifepder afrscwd? from sppgrvisipp wbgp hg; 
52 (i) changes his residence from the residence that he reported as his correct address to 
53 another residence, without notifying the Division of Juvenile Justice Services or obtaining 
54 pgflnjggion; QT 
55 (ii) for the purpose of avoiding supervision: 
56 (A) hides at a different location from his reported residence: or 
57 (B) l^vgsbi§rgpQrtg4rg§i4gnpgf 
58 Section 2. Section 62A-7-106 (Effective 07/01/04) is amended to read: 
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59 62A-7-106 (Effective 07/01/04). Aiding or concealing youth offender — Trespass -
60 Criminal penalties. 
61 (1) A person who commits any of the following offenses is guilty of a class A 
62 misdemeanor: 
63 (a) entering, or attempting to enter, a building or enclosure appropriated to the use of 
64 youth offenders, without permission; 
65 (b) entering any premises belonging to a secure facility and committing or attempting 
66 to commit a trespass or depredation on those premises; or 
67 (c) willfully annoying or disturbing the peace and quiet of a secure facility or of a youth 
68 offender in a secure facility. 
69 (2) A person is guilty of a third degree felony who: 
70 (a) knowingly haibors or conceals a youth offender who has: 
71 (i) escaped from a secure facility; or 
72 (ii) absconded from: 
73 <A) a facility or supervision^ as these offenses arc defined in Subsections 
74 76*8-309.5(1) and (2)]; or 
75 (B) supervision of the Division of Juvenile Justice Services; or 
76 (b) willfully aided or assisted a youth offender who has been lawfully committed to a 
77 secure facility in escaping or attempting to escape from that facility. 
78 (3) As used in this section: 
79 fa) a ypptfr pffffldff atocppds fr<?m a ftsrtfty wton he: 
80 (i) leaves the facility without permission: or 
81 (ii) fails to return at a prescribed time. 
82 (b) A vouth offender absconds from supervision when he: 
83 (i) changes his residence from the residence that he reported as his correct address to 
84 another residence, without notifying the Division of Juvenile Justice Services or obtaining 
85 permwiQn; <?r 
86 (ii) for the purpose of avoiding supervision: 
87 (A) hides at a different location from his reported residence: or 
88 (B) leaygg to reported regifaare, 
89 Section 3. Section 76-8-306 is amended to read: 
- 3 -
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90 76-8-306. Obstruction of justice — Elements — Penalties — Exceptions. 
91 (1) An actor commits obstruction of justice if the actor, with intent to hinder, delay, or 
92 prevent the investigation, apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or punishment of any person 
93 regarding conduct that constitutes a criminal offense: 
94 (a) provides any person with a weapon; 
95 (b) prevents by force, intimidation, or deception, any person from performing any act 
96 that might aid in the discovery, apprehension, prosecution, conviction, or punishment of any 
97 person; 
98 (c) alters, destroys, conceals, or removes any item or other thing; 
99 (d) makes, presents, or uses any item or thing known by the actor to be false; 
100 (e) harbors or conceals a person; 
101 (f) provides a person with transportation, disguise, or other means of avoiding 
102 discovery or apprehension; 
103 (g) warns any person of impending discovery or apprehension; 
104 <h) conceals information that is not privileged and that concerns the offense, after a 
105 judge or magistrate has ordered the actor to provide the information; or 
106 (i) provides false information regarding a suspect, a witness, the conduct constituting 
107 an offense, or any other material aspect of the investigation. 
108 (2) (a) As used in this section, "conduct that constitutes a criminal offense" means 
109 conduct that would be punishable as a crime and is separate from a violation of this section, 
110 and includes: 
111 (i) any violation of a criminal statute or ordinance of this state, its political 
112 subdivisions, any other state, or any district, possession, or territory of the United States; and 
113 (ii) conduct committed by a juvenile which would be a crime if committed by an adult 
114 (b) A violation of a criminal statute that is committed in another state, or any district, 
115 possession, or territory of the United States, is a: 
116 (i) capital felony if the penalty provided includes death or life imprisonment without 
117 parole; 
118 (ii) a first degree felony if the penalty provided includes life imprisonment with parole 
119 or a maximum term of imprisonment exceeding 15 years; 
120 (iii) a second degree felony if the penalty provided exceeds five years; 
. 4 -
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121 (iv) a third degree felony if the penalty provided includes imprisonment for any period 
122 exceeding one year; and 
123 (v) a misdemeanor if the penalty provided includes imprisonment for any period of one 
124 year or less. 
125 (3) The penalties for obstruction of justice are: 
126 (a) a second degree felony if the conduct which constitutes an offense would be a 
127 capital felony or first degree felony; 
128 (b) a third degree felony if: 
129 (i) the conduct that constitutes an offense would be a second or third degree felony and 
130 the actor violates Subsection (1 Xb), (c), (d), (e), or (f); 
131 (ii) the conduct that constitutes an offense would be any offense other than a capital or 
132 first degree felony and the actor violates Subsection (1 )(a); or 
133 (iii) the obstruction of justice is presented or committed before a court of law; or 
134 (c) a class A misdemeanor for any violation of this section that is not enumerated under 
135 Subsection (3)(a) or (b). 
136 (4) It is not a defense that the actor was unaware of the level of penalty for the conduct 
137 constituting an offense. 
138 (5) Subsection (l)(e) does not apply to harboring a youth offender, which is governed 
139 by Section 62A-7-106, 
140 (6) Subsection (l)(b) does not apply to: 
141 (a) tempering with a juror, which is governed by Section 76-8-508,5; 
142 (b) influencing, impeding, or retaliating against a judge or member of the Board of 
143 Pardons and Parole, which is governed by Section 76-8-508; 
144 (c) tampering with a witness, which is governed by Section 76-8-508; or 
145 (d) extortion or bribery to dismiss a criminal proceeding, which is governed by Section 
146 76-8-509. 
147 (7) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), (2), or (3), an actor commits a third degree felony 
148 if the actor harbors or conceals an offender who has[: (a) absconded from a facility or from 
149 supervision as those offenses axe defined in Section 76-8*309.5; or (b)] escaped from official 
150 custody as defined in Section 76-8-309. 
151 Section 4. Repealer. 
- 5 -
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152 This bill repeals: 
153 Section 76-8-309*5, Absconding — Definitions — Penalty. 
154 Section5. Effective date. 
155 (I) If approved bv two-thirds of all the members elected to each house, this bill takes 
156 effect upon approval bv the governor, or the day following the constitutional time limit of Utah 
157 Constitution Article VII. Section 8. without the governors signature, or in the case of a veto. 
158 the date pf vgtp pvqpidfr 
159 (2) Section 62A-7-106 (Effective 07/01/04) takes effect July L 2004. 
Legislative Review Note 
as of 1-29-04 11:59 AM 
A limited legal review of this legislation raises no obvious constitutional or statutory concerns. 
Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel 
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